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NOTES
THE AUTOMATIC COMPANION RULE: AN APPROPRIATE
STANDARD TO JUSTIFY THE TERRY FRISK OF AN
ARRESTEE'S COMPANION?
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has said" 'no right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded'" than the fourth amendment's proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures.' Therefore, searches and seizures
generally must be supported by probable cause2 to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory police action.3
The Supreme Court recognized an exception to the probable cause re-
quirement in Terry v. Ohio.4 It noted that certain encounters between
police and the public do not comport with traditional arrest situations'
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891)); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971)
(" 'The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police... is at the core
of the Fourth Amendment.'" (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949),
overruled on other grounds, 367 U.S. 643 (1961))).
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. States must comply with the provisions of the fourth amendment
pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
2. See e'g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227-29 (1983) (search warrant requires
probable cause); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 (1959) (probable cause neces-
sary for arrest). For a definition of probable cause, see infra notes 22-23 and accompany-
ing text.
3. This sort of police action provided the historical basis for the probable cause re-
quirement. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) ("The general warrant,
in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance
... both perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on
suspicion." (footnote omitted)). Thus, prior to Terry, all searches and seizures, whether
made pursuant to a warrant or not, had to be based on probable cause. See Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); see, e.g.,
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) (search warrant must be based on probable
cause); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963) (warrantless arrest and search inci-
dent thereto must be based on probable cause).
4. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983); Michi-
gan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698 (1981).
5. "An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution.... [A] perfectly reason-
able apprehension of danger may [nonetheless] arise long before the officer is possessed of
adequate information to justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecut-
ing him for a crime." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968); see eg., Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983) (police may search passenger compartment of car
where reasonable suspicion of danger exists); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111
n.6 (1977) (per curiam) (officer effecting lawful traffic detention may ask driver to step
out of car without violating reasonableness requirement of fourth amendment).
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and, therefore, should be evaluated under the fourth amendment's gen-
eral proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. 6 Thus,
under Terry a police officer may "stop"7 a person manifesting criminal
behavior8 and "frisk"9 that person if the officer reasonably believes that
person is armed and dangerous.10
Subsequent applications of the Terry standard to a "stop and frisk"'"
of an arrestee's companion have created confusion among the courts of
appeals. 2 In United States v. Berryhill,3 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit established the "automatic companion"1 4 rule, a bright-
line standard that approves virtually any frisk of an arrestee's compan-
ion. 5 Some courts either adopt or approve of the rule1 6 while others
refuse to accept it, questioning its constitutionality. 7 The courts that
refuse to accept the rule interpret Terry to require an examination of the
6. U.S. Const. amend. IV. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Prior to Terry,
the reasonableness of a search or seizure was determined only upon a showing of probable
cause. In Terry, the Court for the first time recognized an exception to the probable
cause requirement applicable to certain police activity less intrusive than a full search and
arrest. See id. To justify this exception, the Court distinguished between the warrant
clause of the fourth amendment and the general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures. See id.; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-10 (1979).
7. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
8. Id. at 30.
9. Id. at 10.
10. Id. at 30. For a discussion of the scope of probable cause and reasonable suspi-
cion see infra notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
11. A stop and frisk is an on-the-street stop, interrogation and "pat-down" of a per-
son for weapons. Id. at 12.
12. Compare United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971) (com-
panion of arrestee may automatically be frisked for weapons) with United States v. Bell,
762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir.) (police must have reasonable suspicion that arrestee's com-
panion is armed before frisking), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985).
13. 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971).
14. United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 498 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 853
(1985).
15. See Berryhill, 445 F.2d at 1193. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
applied this bright-line rule again in United States v. Vaughan, 718 F.2d 332, 334-35 (9th
Cir. 1983), although the court did not cite Berryhill.
16. See United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Berry-
hill with approval); United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(extending Berryhill's bright-line rule to companion who arrives during the arrest); see
also United States v. Vaughan, 718 F.2d 332, 334-35 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying automatic
companion rule without citing to Berryhill).
A number of state courts apply the automatic companion rule as well. See, e.g., State
v. Clevidence, 153 Ariz. 295, 299, 736 P.2d 379, 382 (1987); Lewis v. United States, 399
A.2d 559, 561-62 (D.C. 1979); People v. Evans, 22 Ill. App. 3d 733, 735-36, 317 N.E.2d
734, 735-36 (1974); State v. Dougherty, 493 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Or. App. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Hook, 313 Pa. Super. 1, 18-19, 459 A.2d 379, 388-89 (1983); State v. Flynn, 92
Wis. 2d 427, 435-36, 285 N.W.2d 710, 714 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 846 (1980).
17. See United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell,
762 F.2d 495, 498 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985); see also United States v.
Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (in dictum, court indicated it
would not follow automatic companion rule), overruled on other grounds, 834 F.2d 1179
(5th Cir. 1987).
A UTOMA TIC COMPANION RULE
"totality of the circumstances""8 of a stop and frisk, including, but not
limited to, companionship. 9
This Note addresses whether the automatic companion rule consti-
tutes an appropriate bright-line standard for a stop and frisk for weapons
of an arrestee's companion. Part I discusses the fourth amendment's re-
quirement of probable cause and the exception to that requirement cre-
ated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio with regard to a stop and a
protective frisk for weapons. Part II examines the subsequent difference
of opinion among the courts of appeals in applying the Terry standard to
the frisking of an arrestee's companion and argues that the automatic
companion rule does not meet the Supreme Court's reasonable suspicion
requirement set out in Terry v. Ohio and Ybarra v. Illinoi 2o Part II also
determines that this area mandates case-by-case adjudication, showing
that a search of an arrestee's companion is an inappropriate circumstance
in which to draw a bright-line rule. This Note concludes that courts
should not adopt the automatic companion rule because it constitutes an
inappropriate extension of the Terry exception to the probable cause
requirement.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Probable Cause
The fourth amendment provides that a search or arrest be conducted
pursuant to a warrant issued only upon a finding of probable cause."1
Supreme Court jurisprudence defines probable cause in the context of a
search warrant as a" 'substantial basis for... conclud[ing]' that a search
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing,"22 and, in the context of an
arrest warrant as facts and circumstances known to the officer that
" 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has
been or is being committed."23 The probable cause requirement repre-
18. Flett, 806 F.2d at 827; Bell, 762 F.2d at 499; United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157,
159 (8th Cir. 1981); Tharpe, 536 F.2d at 1100.
19. See Flett, 806 F.2d at 827; Bell, 762 F.2d at 501; Tharpe, 536 F.2d at 1100. For
example, in Bell, the court considered the location of the arrest, the nature of the crime
for which the arrestee was wanted, and the companion's conduct during the arrest. See
762 F.2d at 500-02.
20. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
21. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
22. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 271 (1960), overruled on other grounds, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)).
23. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
Generally, probable cause to search and to arrest requires the same quantum of evi-
dence; it is the focus of the inquiry that differs. For a search warrant, the inquiry focuses
on the existence and location of incriminating items; for an arrest warrant, the focus is on
the guilt of the arrestee. See 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 3.1(b), at 544-45 (2d ed. 1987). See generally Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave, &
J. Israel, Modem Criminal Procedure 279-80 (6th ed. 1986) (discussion of probable cause
determination).
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sents a compromise between the government's interest in providing effec-
tive law enforcement and citizens' interests in being safeguarded from
arbitrary and unreasonable invasions of their privacy.2" Although prob-
able cause is based upon reasonable belief,25 it must go beyond mere sus-
picion,16 and it must be determined by the factual circumstances of each
case.
27
B. Exceptions to Probable Cause: Terry v. Ohio
The Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth amendment's general
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures 28 to permit cer-
tain searches29 and seizures that are not conducted pursuant to a warrant
or based on probable cause.30 Traditionally, probable cause embodied
the absolute standard for all fourth amendment encounters.3 ' In Terry v.
Ohio,32 however, the Supreme Court created a limited exception to this
rule, holding that a police officer, in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner,33 may stop a person to investigate possibly criminal
behavior, even though no probable cause exists to make an arrest.34 If
the officer reasonably suspects that the person he has stopped is armed
and dangerous, he may "conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing ... in an attempt to discover weapons which may be used to
assault him.' 35 The Court established a general reasonableness stan-
24. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
25. "'The substance of all the definitions' of probable cause 'is a reasonable ground
for belief of guilt.'" Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (quoting Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925)).
26. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963); Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959).
27. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 479. The Court has acknowledged that the inherent
uncertainty of confrontational situations may cause mistakes to be made, but it posited
that mistakes are permitted if they are "those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading
sensibly to their conclusions of probability." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949).
28. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
29. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983) (police may search pas-
senger compartment of car where reasonable suspicion of danger exists); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (protective weapons search requires only reasonable suspicion that
person is armed and dangerous).
30. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (per curiam) (of-
ficer effecting lawful traffic detention may ask driver to step out of car).
31. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1979).
32. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 27. In Terry, a veteran police officer observed three men "casing" an estab-
lishment in a downtown area in mid-afternoon. He observed them walking up and down
the street alternately, approximately twelve times, each time peering into the same win-
dow. Id. at 6. He approached them, identified himself, and asked their names. See id. at
6-7.
35. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). When the three men did not respond to
questions beyond mumbling, the officer frisked Terry for weapons. Id. at 7. Feeling what
he believed to be a weapon, he retrieved a pistol from Terry's coat pocket. Id. He then
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dard3 6 for the stop and frisk, balancing the government's interest in effec-
tive crime prevention and the safety of police officers against the
individual's interest in personal security and privacy.37
The stop and frisk is not subject to traditional probable cause analysis
because it differs from the typical arrest situation.3 8 Terry classifies the
stop and frisk as a search and seizure within the fourth amendment,39
however, rejecting the government's contention that a stop and frisk in-
volves only a "'minor inconvenience and petty indignity' "I and should
not be subject to any fourth amendment analysis. The Court reasoned
that if a stop and frisk did not fall under the rubric of the fourth amend-
ment, the initial confrontation between the police and public would go
unscrutinized by the Constitution, thereby eradicating certain limitations
on police conduct necessary for the protection of individual rights.4
The individual has the right to be free from arbitrary, on-the-street
patted down the other two men, finding a revolver on one of them. See id. The Court
noted that it was reasonable to assume the men were contemplating a robbery, which was
likely to involve weapons, id. at 28, and also that the police officer acted correctly in
patting them down first, and only searching further after he felt weapons. Id at 29-30.
36. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). To justify the invasion, the officer's
suspicions must be based on specific, articulable facts. Id at 21.
37. See id at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
The Court, in Camara, developed this balancing approach in determining the need for a
warrant to conduct a regulatory housing inspection, weighing the government's interests
in public health and safety against the individual's interest in privacy. See 387 U.S. at
530-34. It used the balancing approach to find a lower threshold of probable cause neces-
sary for that warrant, id at 538, concluding that probable cause existed if "reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular dwelling." Id
38. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
16 (1968). A brief, on-the-street seizure differs from a custodial arrest in its duration,
level of intrusion, and long-range results. See 3 W. LaFave, supra note 23, § 9.1(d), at
342.
39. See 392 U.S. at 19.
40. Id at 10 (quoting People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 447, 201 N.E.2d 32, 36, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458, 464 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965)). The Court stated that
whenever a police officer limits a person's freedom to walk away, he has seized the person
and that to refuse to acknowledge a pat-down as a search is "sheer torture of the English
language." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
41. See id at 17. The Court was concerned with police abuse of field interrogations,
particularly with respect to minority groups, either to build up the power image of the
police or to harass undesirables and drive them away. See id. at 13-15 & nn.9-1 1.
Although the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961), is to deter police misconduct, see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-
93 (1914), the Court found that the rule inadequately safeguards the individual's personal
security interest in this circumstance because it plays no part in deterring police viola-
tions of the fourth amendment when the police have no interest in procuring evidence for
prosecution: when police instigate illegal encounters, they are not necessarily motivated
by possible convictions of the individual. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-15 & nn.9-1 1. There-
fore, excluding wrongfully obtained evidence at trial often does little to deter police mis-
conduct in stop and frisk cases. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-14; 3 W. LaFave, supra note
23, § 9.1(e), at 347; Note, The Automatic Companion Rule: A Bright Line Standard for
the Terry Frisk of an Arrestee's Companion, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 751, 753 & nn.19-21
(1987).
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
encounters with police,42 and, even if the stop is justified, Terry acknowl-
edges that an individual has the right to be free from severe intrusions-
frisks-upon his personal security.4 3 The Court held, however, that
these interests must be balanced against society's interest in effective
crime prevention and in protecting police officers acting in furtherance of
their duties.4 The Court concluded that a stop and frisk is reasonable if
it is based upon "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru-
sion."45 The intrusion, however, must be strictly limited by the circum-
stances that justify its initiation:46 the stop must result from the exercise
of a legitimate investigative interest,47 and the search must not go beyond
a cursory pat-down for weapons unless a weapon is felt, in which case,
the officer may remove it from the arrestee's person.48
In Terry the Court professed, and subsequently has reiterated, its hold-
ing allowing protective weapons searches based on reasonable suspicion
to be a narrow exception to the probable cause requirement. 49 It de-
clined in Terry to develop comprehensive limitations on the reasonable
suspicion standard,5" instead calling specifically for case-by-case adjudi-
42. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
43. See 392 U.S. at 24-25.
44. See id. at 23-24; accord Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979); Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
45. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The Court made it clear that suspicions based on
"hunches" would not justify an intrusion. Id. at 27. For a discussion of the facts of
Terry, see supra notes 34 & 35.
The mandate for factual justification runs throughout the Court's fourth amendment
decisions. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (allowing Terry search
of passenger compartment of vehicle if police can point to specific facts justifying reason-
able belief); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979) (mere presence on premises of
authorized narcotics search without specific factors pointing to reasonable suspicion does
not justify cursory search for weapons); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1972)
(allowing Terry frisk based on reliable informant's tip if other facts point to reasonable
suspicion that officer may be in danger); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964) (unsup-
ported "reports" of criminal activity not enough to justify arrest for numbers running).
46. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
47. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
48. See id. at 29-30; supra note 35; see, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65
(1968) (police officer's search of suspect's pockets neither motivated by, nor limited to,
safety precaution).
49. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1968). Later Supreme Court decisions also have
indicated that Terry was meant to be a narrow exception to the probable cause require-
ment. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 94 (1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979). There presently appears
to be a propensity, however, for the Court to extend exceptions to the probable cause
requirement to a wider variety of situations. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct.
1492, 1501-02 (1987) (plurality opinion) (work-related misconduct investigations); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (searches of schoolchildren); see also United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 711-14 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result) (criticizing
Court's expansion of Terry exception).
50. 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
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cation of protective weapons searches by lower courts.5'
II. PROTECTIVE WEAPONS SEARCH OF A COMPANION
OF AN ARRESTEE
A. Automatic Companion Rule
The Supreme Court's refusal to elaborate on the reasonable suspicion
exception has spawned conflicting interpretations of Terry.52 Several
courts have attempted to apply the Terry standard to a protective search
for weapons of an arrestee's companion.53 In United States v. Berryhill,4
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit established a bright-line rule
that "[a]l companions of the arrestee within the immediate vicinity, ca-
pable of accomplishing a harmful assault on the officer, are constitution-
ally subject to the cursory 'pat-down' reasonably necessary to give
assurance that they are unarmed."" This "automatic companion" rule,
51. Id; see, e.g., United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985).
52. See Comment, Terry Revisited- Critical Update on Recent Stop-and-Frisk Devel-
opments, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 877, 879 [hereinafter, Comment, Terry Revisited]. Compare
United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Terry does not authorize
searching shoulder bag) with People v. Moore, 32 N.Y.2d 67, 70-71, 295 N.E.2d 780, 783,
343 N.Y.S.2d 107, 111-12 (allows search of handbag), cerl denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973).
Courts and commentators agree that Terry established a lesser standard than probable
cause, but also criticize the decision for not providing clear direction. See Comment,
Fourth Amendment Rights of Persons Present When a Search Warrant is Executed:
Ybarra v. Illinois, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 453, 459 & n.45 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Ybarra
v. Illinois]; see, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 888-90 (1975) (Doug-
las, J., concurring) (criticizing Terry's widespread application as "a weakening of the
Fourth Amendment"); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L
Rev. 349, 394-95 (1974) (finding Terry's reasonableness standard difficult to apply).
53. Compare United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing
automatic companion rule with approval) and United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 921-
22 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (extending automatic companion rule) and United States
v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971) (automatic companion rule) with United
States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986) (requiring examination of totality of the
circumstances) and United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985) and United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1100-01 (5th Cir.
1976) (en banc) (examining totality of the circumstances), overruled on other grounds, 834
F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) and United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1973)
(same).
54. 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971).
55. See id at 1193; accord United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.
1977); see also United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(extends automatic companion rule to companion who arrives during the arrest).
In United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971), the officers had a warrant
for the defendant's arrest for a postal violation. They knew of his prior arrests and that
he usually carried weapons. Id. at 1192. The officers stopped the defendant, with his
wife, in his car at a busy intersection. Id After they ordered him out of the car and
searched him, they ostensibly searched his wife's purse for weapons. Id The search did
not uncover a weapon, but did produce evidence that was used to convict Berryhill. See
id
In United States v. Vaughan, 718 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983), the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit again followed the automatic companion rule set out in Berryhill but
19881
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on its face, does not require that the officer have any suspicion about the
56arrestee's companion, nor has any court indicated that the rule requires
as much." The rule permits the arrestee's companion to be frisked solely
on the basis of companionship. 8 The court in Berryhill reasoned that
allowing such a limited intrusion on a categorical basis best serves Terry's
concerns with respect to police officer safety.5 9
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits reject
the automatic companion rule, adopting instead a totality-of-the-circum-
stances test.6° These courts acknowledge the safety concerns aired by the
Supreme Court in Terry,61 however, they focus more on the Court's call
for specific, factual justification of a frisk based on reasonable suspicion,62
by requiring that a frisk of an arrestee's companion be based on specific,
articulable facts known to the officer at the time of the search.63 The
circumstances examined by these courts to determine if reasonable suspi-
did not cite to the case. Id. at 334. The court held that "[d]espite the lack of probable
cause to arrest Vaughan [the arrestee's companion], the police had a right to detain him
briefly to ... engage in a limited Terry 'stop and frisk' to determine that he had no
weapons that might endanger the officers." Id. at 334.
For a selection of state cases that apply the automatic companion rule, see supra note
16.
56. See United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971).
57. See Note, supra note 41, at 751 n.10. See generally United States v. Vaughan, 718
F.2d 332, 335 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.
1977); United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 920-21 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
58. United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971); see Comment,
United States v. Bell: Rejecting Guilt by Association in Search and Seizure Cases, 61
Notre Dame L. Rev. 258, 269 (1986).
59. Berryhill, 445 F.2d at 1193 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)); see Note,
supra note 41, at 755; see also United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.
1977) (discussing potential dangers involved in custodial arrest); United States v. Poms,
484 F.2d 919, 921 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (discussing dangers of associates attempt-
ing to free the arrestee).
60. See United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell,
762 F.2d 495, 498 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985); United States v. Tharpe,
536 F.2d 1098, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, 834 F.2d
1179 (5th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157, 162 (8th Cir. 1981)
(refusing to extend Terry to permit a frisk based on less than reasonable belief simply
because the person happened to arrive while a search warrant was being executed);
United States v. Cole, 628 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1043 (1981).
61. See United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell,
762 F.2d 495, 501-02 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985); United States v.
Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1100 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, 834
F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987).
62. See Flett, 806 F.2d at 827; Bell, 762 F.2d at 499-500; Tharpe, 536 F.2d at 1100.
The reasonable suspicion standard does not require that the officer actually experience
fear of potential harm, but merely that, based on sufficient facts, the officer reasonably
believe that the person with whom he is dealing is armed and dangerous. Accord Flelt,
806 F.2d at 828; see Tharpe, 536 F.2d at 1101.
63. See United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell,
762 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985); United States v. Tharpe,
536 F.2d 1098, 1100 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, 834 F.2d 1179
(5th Cir. 1987).
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cion exists include companionship, but are not limited to it.64
B. The Automatic Companion Rule is Inconsistent
with Reasonable Suspicion
While the Supreme Court has never considered the constitutionality of
the automatic companion rule,65 its decisions in related areas indicate
that the automatic companion rule conflicts with the fourth amend-
ment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures because
the rule permits a stop and frisk on less than reasonable suspicion. 66 Ac-
cordingly, pursuant to the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court re-
quires that intrusions into personal security "must be based on specific,
objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require [such
intrusions]."'67
In Ybarra v. Illinois,68 the Court, applying Terry, clearly held that the
mere presence of an individual at a place subject to a search based on
probable cause is insufficient to justify a Terry frisk and, thus, clearly
rejected the notion of guilt by association.69 The Ybarra Court refused to
64. See Flett, 806 F.2d at 827; Bell, 762 F.2d at 500-02; Tharpe, 536 F.2d at 1100.
For example, in Bell, the court considered five factors: (1) that the arrestee was known to
be potentially armed and dangerous; (2) that Bell was in the car with the arrestee; (3) that
Bell could not be ruled out as the arrestee's accomplice of the week before; (4) that the
car was parked in a relatively crowded place, with people milling around it; and (5) that
Bell, while staring at the agent "defiantly," refused to comply with the agent's com-
mands. 762 F.2d at 502.
In Kett, the court considered a different set of five factors: (1) that the arrest was for a
narcotics violation; (2) that the arrestee, who had a prior gun charge, was the known
enforcer of a gang; (3) that Flett's car was unfamiliar, bearing out-of-state license plates;
(4) that Flett resembled known gang members; and (5) that Flett was in the arrestee's
home. 806 F.2d at 827-28.
65. See Flett, 806 F.2d at 826.
66. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
67. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
663 (1979)); see, eg., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1983) (search of passen-
ger compartment of arrestee's car); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (search for
weapons of tavern patron); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1979) (pre-
arrest custodial interrogation); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (search
incident to lawful arrest may not extend beyond room where arrest takes place); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (protective frisk for weapons); United States v. DiRe, 332
U.S. 581, 587 (1948) (mere presence in a suspected car insufficient to justify a personal
search for contraband).
Although the Court has held that the fourth amendment does not absolutely require
individualized suspicion, see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)
(allowing routine border checkpoint stops), exceptions to the individualized suspicion
requirement may be made only "where the privacy interests implicated by a search are
minimal and where 'other safeguards' are available 'to assure that the individual's reason-
able expectation of privacy is not "subject to the discretion of the official in the field.'"
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979) (citation omitted)). The automatic companion rule, however,
impairs more than minimal privacy interests and other safeguards do not exist. See infra
notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
68. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
69. See id at 93-94.
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uphold the search of a bar patron conducted during a search of the bar
and bartender pursuant to a warrant.7 ° It held that the patron's search
was based merely on the defendant's presence in the bar, 7 and that prob-
able cause did not exist to justify the intrusion on the defendant. 72 Fur-
thermore, the frisk also violated the Terry reasonableness standard
because the police could provide no specific, articulable facts to justify a
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous."
The decision stressed that the narrow scope of Terry does not permit a
frisk for weapons based on less than reasonable suspicion, even though
the defendant happens to be present during the execution of a search
warrant.74 By repeating the Terry articulable reasonable suspicion stan-
dard in Ybarra," the Court reflected its concern that unwarranted
searches might otherwise become arbitrary or discriminatory.76
Although the reasoning adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Berryhil177 relies on Terry,78 the automatic
companion rule in fact conflicts with the Court's analysis in Terry. A
rule holding a companion automatically subject t6 a frisk cannot be rec-
onciled with the Supreme Court's mandate in Terry and Ybarra that the
police may conduct a pat-down for weapons only when they can provide
specific, articulable facts indicating a reasonable suspicion that the indi-
vidual to be frisked is armed and dangerous. 79 The automatic compan-
ion rule permits the search of any companion of an arrestee, requiring
neither individualized suspicion as to the companion, nor an inquiry into
the companion's physical ability to harm the police officer.8 0 The dispos-
70. See id. at 96.
71. See id. at 94. While conducting a "cursory search for weapons" of all patrons,
one of the officers felt a cigarette package in Ybarra's pocket, but did not extricate it.
Several minutes later, the officer frisked Ybarra again, removed the cigarette package
from his pocket, and discovered heroin inside. See id. at 88-89.
72. Neither the search warrant nor the defendant himself gave any indication that he
or any of the other patrons of the bar were engaged in criminal conduct. Id. at 91-92.
"[A] person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity
does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person." Id. at 91
(citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968)).
73. See id. at 93-94. Among the factors the Court considered were: (1) the sufficient
lighting of the bar; (2) the fact that Ybarra was not a known criminal; (3) that his hands
were empty; (4) that he made no threatening gestures; and (5) that he was not dressed
unusually (for example, wearing a heavy coat in August). Id. at 93.
74. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979); accord United States v. Thomas,
No. 86-1353, slip op. 4383, 4398 (9th Cir. filed April 14, 1988).
75. See id. at 93-94.
76. See Comment, Ybarra v. Illinois, supra note 52, at 463.
77. 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971).
78. See id. at 1193.
79. See United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell,
762 F.2d 495, 498-99 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985); United States v.
Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, 834
F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987); 3 W. LaFave, supra note 23, § 9.4(a), at 509-12; Comment,
supra note 58, at 269-70.
80. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. Although the term "capable" of
inflicting harm indicates the existence of some level of physical ability, see Webster's New
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itive factor justifying the search is simply the companion's association
with the arrestee, 1 a direct contradiction of Ybarra's rejection of guilt by
association. 2
According to the Court's mandate in Terry, courts must evaluate the
totality of the circumstances leading to a search of an arrestee's compan-
ion to determine if specific, articulable facts exist justifying reasonable
suspicion that the companion is armed and dangerous.8 3 Although com-
panionship certainly is a factor to be examined,"4 other circumstances,
such as the nature of the arrestee's suspected violation, the conduct and
demeanor of the companion, the time and place of the arrest, and the
opportunity for the arrestee's companion to harm the officer must be
considered.85 Because the automatic companion rule does not require an
examination of the totality of the circumstances,8 6 the rule is an inappro-
priate extension of Terry.87
Universal Unabridged Dictionary 267 (2d ed. 1983), courts applying the rule have not
addressed this factor separately. See Note, supra note 41, at 751 n.10. See generally
United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Poris, 484 F.2d
919 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir.
1971).
81. See supra notes 58, 80 and accompanying text.
82. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979). The Court relied in part on United
States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) in which it held that it was "not convinced that a
person, by mere presence... loses immunities from search of his person to which he
would otherwise be entitled." Id. at 587.
83. See United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell,
762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985); United States v. Tharlp
536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane), overruled on other grounds, 834 F.2d 1179
(5th Cir. 1987); cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (requires examination of the
circumstances to determine reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk suspect). See generally
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) ("There is no formula
for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and
circumstances.').
84. See United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell,
762 F.2d 495, 500-02 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985); United States v.
Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane), overruled on other grounds,
834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987).
85. See lett, 806 F.2d at 827-28; Bell, 762 F.2d at 500-02; Tharpe, 536 F.2d at 1100;,
United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1973). These considerations derive
from various Supreme court cases. See, eg., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-93 (1979)
(looking to sufficient lighting of bar, anonymity of Ybarra, his conduct and demeanor in
refusing to uphold the frisk); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972) (consider-
ing time of day, report that person was armed, and disregard of request to get out of car
in allowing the search); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968) (considering the number of
people in the area, demeanor of the arrestees, and their refusal to cooperate with the
officer); see also 3 W. LaFave, supra note 23, § 9.4(a), at 511 (relevant circumstances
include the nature of the crime, the time and place of the arrest, the number of officers
present, and the conduct of the companion); Comment, Terry Revisited, supra note 52, at
886-892 (factors to determine reasonable suspicion include appearance, conduct, criminal
record, environment, police purpose, and source of information).
86. See generally United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Berryhill, 445
F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971).
87. See United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827-28 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
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C. The Automatic Companion Rule is an Inappropriate
Bright-Line Rule
An analysis of the totality of the circumstances to determine the pro-
priety of a protective search for weapons of an arrestee's companion can
be performed only on a case-by-case basis.88 Because the circumstances
of each case differ, bright-line rules pose the danger of becoming so arbi-
trary and confusing that they will offer no guidance to police officers
conducting these searches.89 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Terry clearly
mandated a case-by-case application of its standard of reasonable suspi-
cion to protective weapons searches. 90
The automatic companion rule is an inappropriate bright-line rule for
several reasons. It fails to delineate clear and certain boundaries so that
it may be applied without a case-by-case analysis.9 The rule does not
define companionship, thereby producing inconsistent results in cases
with similar facts.9 2
Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 498 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985); Comment, supra note
58, at 270.
88. See Comment, supra note 58, at 270.
89. See Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
227, 287 (1984). Professor Alschuler has suggested a whimsical but daunting picture of
the future of the fourth amendment clouded by bright-line rules in the characterization of
a 1990 police academy graduate:
Gazenga is a good officer. He has memorized all 437 Supreme Court bright-line
rules for search and seizure. For example, Gazenga has made a lawful arrest in
a car. Gazenga rip that car apartl But Gazenga never touch trunk of car unless
there is probable cause, for Gazenga has read footnote 4 of Belton opinion.
Now Gazenga has made a lawful arrest in a house. Different bright-line rule
apply to a house. Gazenga may search glove compartment of car when suspect
far away, but may not search desk drawer in living room unless suspect right
there. Why? Supreme Court say so. Gazenga just a cop. Gazenga now has
made lawful arrest in cabin cruiser. Oh nol Supreme Court forgot to give
Gazenga bright-line rule for cabin cruiser! What is poor Gazenga to do?
Id. at 286 (footnote omitted).
90. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968). Later cases support this reading. See,
e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209
& n.11 (1979); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 249 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-64 (1968); United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823,
827-28 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 853 (1985). The Court has applied the Terry analysis to other search and
seizure issues as well. See, eg., O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1503 (1987) (work-
related misconduct investigations); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)
(searches of schoolchildren).
91. This is one of the criteria Professor LaFave suggests to justify the creation of a
bright-line rule. See LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Draw-
ing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith" 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 307, 325-26 (1982). LaFave
proposes several other requirements as well: the rule must produce results similar to
those obtained through case-by-case analysis, see infra note 92 and accompanying text,
the rule must respond to a genuine need to reject case-by-case application as unworkable,
see infra note 93 and accompanying text, and the rule must not be subject to ready ma-
nipulation and abuse, see infra note 94 and accompanying text.
92. Compare United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 921-22 (4th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) (rule applies to person who arrives during arrest) with United States v. Clay, 640
F.2d 157, 162 (8th Cir. 1981) (rule inapplicable to person who arrives during arrest).
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Furthermore, no genuine need to forego case-by-case analysis exists.
Those cases applying the totality-of-the-circumstances approach arrive at
consistent outcomes by examining specific factors that give rise to rea-
sonable suspicion.93 Last, the automatic companion rule is subject to
manipulation and abuse because it may be the source of incriminating
information against the companion, yet is not predicated on the appro-
priate justification of reasonable suspicion of bodily harm.9 4 This may
produce the unacceptable result of an unjustified frisk producing an
arrest.95
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has promulgated bright-line rules in a
number of cases involving search and seizure issues; however, these situa-
tions do not resemble those to which the automatic companion rule is
applied.96 In some cases, the Court has justified a categorical approach
because the government has an interest in maintaining police safety and
in preventing destruction of evidence. 97 In other cases, the Court has
justified a categorical intrusion because the police action involves a rela-
tively minor inconvenience to the individual. 9 These interests, however,
do not exist with respect to the automatic companion rule.
In Chimel v. California,9 9 United States v. Robinson,I"o and New York
v. Belton,101 the Supreme Court indicated that the government's interests
in protecting the police officer's safety and preventing the destruction of
evidence during a lawful custodial arrest so outweighed the arrestee's pri-
vacy interest that a bright-line rule was appropriate.10 2 These cases per-
Additionally, the rule itself does not define the capability requirement, nor has any subse-
quent court explained it. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
93. Seea eg., United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 500-02 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985).
94. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text. The automatic companion rule
represents an erosion of the fourth amendment safeguards "to the point that an individ-
ual may be frisked based upon nothing more than an unfortunate choice of associates."
United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985).
95. Cf Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968) ("an incident search may not
precede an arrest and serve as part of its justification").
96. See infra notes 97-113.
97. See eg., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (passenger compartment
of automobile may be searched incident to a lawful custodial arrest); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (search incident to a custodial arrest); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (search of "grab area" incident to an arrest).
98. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (detention of occupants
of premises during valid search pursuant to a warrant founded on probable cause); Penn-
sylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per curiam) (detention of person outside of
vehicle while officer issues traffic citation).
99. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
100. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
101. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
102. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Although
these decisions involve custodial arrests and implicate an additional governmental inter-
est beyond that justifying the automatic companion rule, even they have been criticized as
going too far. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 470-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Robinson, 414
U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Alschuler, supra note 89, at 259; LaFave, "Case-by-
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mitted automatic searches-incident to a custodial arrest-of the
arrestee, °3 his "grab area, ' '" °" and the passenger compartment of his
car. '
0 5
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms 10 6 and Michigan v. Summers, 10 7 the Court
adopted a categorical approach to de minimis detention cases because it
found that the interests of the government outweighed the inconvenience
to the individual.'0 s In Mimms, it upheld the brief detention of the
driver of a car outside of his vehicle while a police officer issued him a
traffic citation,10 9 reasoning that detention involves only an incremental
intrusion beyond an initial, justified stop."0 The Court balanced the
"petty indignity"11' suffered by the individual against the heightened
danger to the police officer both in dealing with people in automobiles
and in standing exposed to traffic."' In Summers, it held that probable
cause for a search warrant implicitly justifies the detention of the occu-
pants of the premises being searched," 3 again balancing the strong gov-
ernment interests in safety against the minor intrusion to the individual.
The circumstances in which the courts of appeals apply the automatic
companion rule differ significantly from those in which the Supreme
Court has drawn bright-line rules. Of importance is the fact that Chimel,
Robinson, and Belton draw bright-line rules with respect to arrestees, 4
not arrestee's companions. Moreover, the overriding concern in a case
involving a protective frisk for weapons of the companion of an arrestee
is the safety of the police officer. 15
Although this concern clearly is significant, it, without more, does not
Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures"." The Robinson Dilemma, 1974
Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 150-60.
103. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234.
104. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The grab area is the "area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items." Id.
105. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
106. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
107. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
108. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-05 (1981); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, Ill (1977) (per curiam).
109. Mimms, 434 U.S. at I 11. The Court noted that it was the order to get out of the
car that constituted the intrusion. Id.
110. Id.
111. The Court noted that brief detention outside the vehicle did not rise to the level of
intrusion of a Terry frisk, stating that it is not even a "petty indignity" much less a
"serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person." Id.
112. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977) (per curiam).
113. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). The Court examined several
factors: (1) that police had a warrant to search the defendant's house, therefore, deten-
tion was only an incremental intrusion; (2) that detention is less intrusive than a search
and is not apt to be exploited since it is not the potential source of information; (3) that
detention in the home provides less public stigma than a custodial arrest culminating in a
visit to the police station; and (4) that law enforcement has an interest in preventing
defendant's disappearance if evidence is found and in minimizing risk to officers
(although no danger to the officers is indicated in the record). Id. at 701-03.
114. See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 41, at 762.
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meet Supreme Court standards for justifying bright-line rules. Chimel
and Belton also require an interest in preventing destruction of evi-
dence.' 16 This interest does not justify the automatic companion rule
because, as the court in Berryhill noted, police may not search a compan-
ion of an arrestee for evidence merely because he is present.' I The only
interest behind the rule, therefore, is the protection of police officers from
harm perpetrated by the arrestee's companion." 8
Furthermore, the automatic companion rule goes beyond the de
minimis intrusion caused by detention justified in Mimms and Summers
to the severe intrusion caused by a personal frisk for weapons. 1 9 In
Terry, the Supreme Court stressed the sanctity of the person to be free
from arbitrary intrusion, 20 and noted that a cursory frisk for weapons
may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment.' 2' The auto-
matic companion rule also presents a greater danger of misuse or ex-
ploitation than does mere detention because the protective search for
weapons offers a potential source of incriminating evidence." 2 The auto-
matic companion rule, therefore, may be abused so as to legitimize an
arrest that is not justified at its inception. 23
CONCLUSION
The automatic companion rule should not be utilized because it con-
tradicts the requirement that fourth amendment seizures at least be based
on reasonable suspicion. Because courts apply it without consideration
of the circumstances in each case, the automatic companion rule permits
unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment.
Requiring police officers to point to "specific and articulable facts"' 24
that would cause the "reasonably prudent man in the circumstances [to]
116. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756 (1969).
117. United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971); see also United
States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948) (mere presence in suspected car does not justify
personal search for evidence).
118. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
119. See United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell.
762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985).
120. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968); see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304
(1967).
121. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. The Court in Terry found the following to be an apt de-
scription of frisk procedure: "the officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of
the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits,
waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs
down to the feet." Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 n.13 (quoting Priar & Martin, Searching and
Disarming Criminals, 45 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 481, 481 (1954)).
122. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979). Compare Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981) (detention is not the source of incriminating evidence) with
United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971) (protective search for
weapons may result in incriminating evidence).
123. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
124. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in dan-
ger"1 25 provides a workable test that more closely addresses the concerns
raised in Terry v. Ohio.
Jeanne C. Serocke
125. Id. at 27.
